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CHAPTER 4
The Business of Working-Class Credit:
Subprime Markets in the United
Kingdom since 1880
Sean O’Connell
Certain consumer credit businesses have historically been associatedwith distinct groups. This has been particularly true of working-classcommunities throughout the industrialized world since the late nine-
teenth century. This chapter uses a case study approach to explore a number
of the themes around which this volume of essays is organized. Via an exami-
nation of the history of Provident Financial PLC, it provides examples of both
transnational similarities in credit provision and details of how cultural and
political patterns in individual countries led to sharply divergent historical
pathways.
Provident is today associated with the United Kingdom’s extensive
subprime credit market, particularly that sector of it populated by low-
income consumers. The term “subprime” is most commonly connected with
developments in the United States during the 1990s, where the diminish-
ing cost of computerized data storage and the emergence of sophisticated risk
modeling led to many consumers, who had been previously categorized as too
risky, being provided with high-cost credit products—even by “conservative
creditors.” These products included subprime credit cards, which attracted
criticism due to their high charges.1
In the United Kingdom, Provident was one of the first companies to
offer such a card, the Vanquis Visa, from 2003. The company, however, has
130 years experience dealing with customers who face difficulties securing
credit from mainstream financial sources. For much of its history, Provident
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marketed products that preempted the subprime credit card in both the flex-
ibility they offered less affluent consumers and in the high costs that were
associated with them. Provident’s story provides insights into the history
of an important part of the United Kingdom’s subprime sector. Unlike a
number of defunct French and German finance companies that employed
similarly bureaucratized and labor-intensive systems, Provident has survived
and thrived in the modern credit market. Its ability to do so centered on
a number of factors, including the approach to credit regulation adopted
by UK governments, the comparatively high levels of financial exclusion
in the United Kingdom, the limited success of British credit unions and
other mutual bodies, and the continuing functionality (albeit a costly one)
of doorstep collections for low-income consumers.
This chapter begins with a brief historical description of the context of
working-class consumer credit in the United Kingdom in the years around
Provident’s creation. The origins of the company are then plotted, before
the discussion turns to the company’s relationships with retailers and con-
sumers. The controversies that emerged from these relationships are explored,
as are accusations that the system was exploitative. The next section dis-
cusses French and German companies that operated schemes not unlike the
Provident system. However, these schemes died off in the second half of
the twentieth century, whereas Provident retained its place among Britain’s
largest financial institutions. Two final sections examine this period. The
first of these explains how Provident attempted to follow the increasingly
affluent working-class consumer up the status hierarchy by offering new
forms of credit and seeking to shake off its association with low-income
consumers. The final section charts the company’s successful and controver-
sial engagement in the United Kingdom’s extensive doorstep moneylending
industry, which, having no European counterpart, demonstrates again that
Provident provides a fascinating vehicle through which to explore the cultural,
economic, and political shaping of consumer credit.
The Context: Working-Class Consumer Credit
in the United Kingdom
As Paul Johnson has demonstrated, the extent and variety of consumer
credit in late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century Britain reflected wide
demand.2 The most familiar consumer credit innovation of the period was
hire purchase, which was associated with growing markets for consumer
durables such as furniture, electric goods, and motor cars.3 In the early twenti-
eth century, the number of hire-purchase contracts rose by a factor of twenty.4
By the late 1930s, hire purchase was believed to facilitate 3.5 percent of all
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retail sales.5 The value of this business was then estimated at around £100 to
£120 million, representing half of all credit sales.
Hire purchase had become the preferred option for credit retailers of
furniture, pianos, and sewing machines in late Victorian Britain, while simul-
taneously raising concerns about high interest rates and high repossession
rates. The latter was the case because—unlike in France, as Sabine Effosse
explains in chapter 8—the retailer had a legal right to reclaim the merchan-
dise if the purchaser fell behind with payments. Until the final payment was
made, the goods were on “hire” to the buyer. Hire purchase was first used
by the British working classes during the 1860s, when Singer marketed its
sewing machines through the method. Many more working-class consumers
became familiar with hire purchase during the Great War, when regular and
remunerative employment in the war industries financed the phenomenon
of the “munitions worker’s piano.” Recent work by Peter Scott has indi-
cated that, in the 1930s, hire purchase facilitated new modes of working-class
living that were related to an array of factors, such as rising home owner-
ship among the best-paid workers, shrinking family sizes, and new modes of
domesticated living.6
While what Scott calls modern working-class consumers were using hire
purchase to shape new lifestyles, extensive use was also made of other modes
of consumer credit for the purchase of nondurable goods. From the mid-
nineteenth century, credit drapers—often labeled tallymen—sold clothing
and drapery from door to door to urban working-class families. The weekly
collection of payments was one factor that ensured goods bought in this
way were costly. High prices and the use of the courts to pursue delinquent
working-class debtors brought frequent controversy to the credit drapers.
So did the fact that they did their business with working-class housewives,
who it was often assumed had been duped or flattered into making ill-advised
purchases. Although this was a highly gendered and negative stereotyping of
the capabilities of many working-class wives, whose role included managing
tight budgets, it was widely believed.7
Formed in 1880, the Provident Clothing and Supply Company claimed
to have developed a fairer and thriftier form of working-class credit for
the “respectable” working classes, who otherwise had to use credit drapers.
Provident sold promissory notes, which it called checks, on installments to
customers who utilized them to buy merchandise in the large number of
stores where they were accepted in lieu of cash. By the late 1930s, Provident,
the other smaller check traders, and the credit drapers were responsible for
the extension of around £100 million in consumer credit per annum. By this
point, Provident had reached its maximum market, serving around 1 million
customers per annum.8
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Also by the 1930s, it was clear that mail-order catalogs, offering cloth-
ing and other merchandise on credit, had unearthed a lucrative market. The
introduction of parcel post in 1883 spurred on the development of several sig-
nificant credit mail-order catalog companies. Unlike their North American
counterparts, who competed with small, local retailers via price, UK mail-
order catalog retailers such as Kays or Empire Stores attracted large numbers
of customers by installment selling. By the 1930s, they were dispatching their
catalogs to hundreds of thousands of agents, who earned small commissions
for selling products. They also carried out informal credit vetting of customers
recruited from their families, neighbors, and workmates. The zenith of credit
mail order was reached between the 1950s and 1970s, when the sector was the
fastest growing in British retail. In 1968, for example, mail order was respon-
sible for 4 percent of all the United Kingdom’s retail sales. More significantly,
it accounted for 48 percent of all credit sales in the retail sector.9
The significant market shares taken by the mail-order companies, check
traders, and tallymen indicated not only significant demand for working-class
consumer credit, but also the continuing importance of traditional forms of
credit based on the commercial penetration of preexisting social networks.
The following case study of Provident allows greater explication of this phe-
nomenon. It also demonstrates how the often deeply complex debates about
the rights and wrongs, benefits and costs, of working-class consumer credit
operated in the context of one major UK company, and it allows deeper
reflection on a number of issues raised above.
The Origins of Provident
The Provident Clothing and Supply Company Limited emerged in 1880.
Ironically, given its controversial history, founder Joshua V. Waddilove
claimed to have commenced its activities because of the “dear” and “lim-
ited” merchandise bought by working-class housewives from tallymen (credit
drapers).10 Having first funded a charitable system to enable women to obtain
goods from retailers who accepted his checks, a company was swiftly formed
to take advantage of the demand that was unearthed.11 Waddilove had been
employed in the thriving Victorian insurance industry, where he witnessed
significant numbers of working-class families paying small sums each week
to collectors for what were termed “industrial insurance policies.” Weekly
doorstep collections and heavy overheads for bureaucracy, which ate up as
much as one-third of payments, made these insurance policies expensive and
subject to regular critiques by middle-class observers.12 Despite this cost, their
popularity was such that one-third of the population had one of these policies
with the market leader, Prudential, by 1900.13 The name “Prudential” was
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selected to stem accusations that the company promoted an unthrifty method
of insurance, and the christening of Provident suggests a similar preemptive
strike in anticipation of future criticism.
As credit drapers had discovered earlier, many Victorians viewed the exten-
sion of consumer credit with suspicion. In particular, those involved in credit
deals with working-class consumers were disdained as “fringe capitalists.”14
The realities of working-class budgeting were frequently miscomprehended
by those holding this attitude. These consumers were exhorted to embrace
thrift and reject debt, not least by influential activists in the cooperative
movement, who felt the latter “was at odds with the principles of coopera-
tive idealism and respectable behaviour.” One widely read cooperative activist
opined that “the credit system of this country is only second in its demoralis-
ing influence to the drinking customs of the people.” However, pressure from
grassroots members who had to manage on incomes that were vulnerable to
unemployment, underemployment, trade slumps, illness, and other factors
militating against a steely commitment to thrift compelled cooperative stores
to offer credit facilities. By 1911, 82 percent of them did so.15
As already indicated, Victorian and Edwardian negative sentiment toward
working-class credit and the perils of indebtedness reached its zenith in dis-
cussion of credit drapers. Being among the heaviest users of the debtors’
courts, credit drapers received extensive press coverage, which frequently por-
trayed them as irresponsible lenders and exploiters of feminine vanity and
gullibility. While it is clear that there were devious characters among them,
most credit drapers made money from establishing long-term relationships
with customers that were based on a strong degree of trust and reciprocity.
Like the insurance companies, they provided an expensive service that was
nonetheless utilitarian for hard-pressed consumers with few alternatives.16
Moreover, as credit draper Ron Barnes recalled, the fact that his transactions
were played out in his customer’s home ensured credit drapers were greeted
with the “natural friendliness” that would have met other personal visitors.17
This intimacy was highly advantageous, proving a more useful method of
limiting bad debt than recourse to the courts. Provident drew upon this
important factor in its own operations.
Provident’s Modus Operandi
Although Provident’s weekly visits to collect repayments echoed the credit
drapery model, as did other aspects of its business, its approach to doorstep
credit had important differences. This circumstance ensured that it attracted
far less bad publicity for using the debtors’ courts, while also assisting
its rise to national prominence. Provident established a triangular credit
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relationship, placing itself between borrowers and retailers. It dispatched
agents to identify customers who would buy its checks, which were then
redeemed via weekly doorstep payments. For this service, customers paid a
fee—or poundage charge—of 1 shilling (5 pence) for each 20 shillings (£1).
This equated to an annual interest rate of 23.3 percent if repaid in the antic-
ipated 20 weeks, although customers typically took 24 weeks to complete
payments.18 Once they acquired a check, customers were free to use it at any
retailer accepting them.
Provident’s success in persuading a great variety of shopkeepers to join
its scheme was the key to its popularity and ensured that its customers pri-
oritized their repayments to it over those to other creditors. In 1908, its
checks could be used to procure merchandise ranging from “photographs
to bassinettes and from barometers to artificial teeth.” Three decades later,
the brochure for Provident’s customers in Wolverhampton included nine-
teen footwear stores, thirteen house furnishers, twenty-one clothing retailers,
eleven opticians, nine purveyors of wireless sets, four jewelers and watchmak-
ers, three wallpaper and paint shops, two secondhand furniture stores, two
secondhand clothes shops, and one coal merchant.19 To establish itself in a
new locality, the company offered key retailers much lower than average rates
for its service. While a department store might be charged 8 percent of the
amount Provident’s customers spent in the store, a hairdresser was asked to
forfeit a hefty 20 percent.20 In the 1930s, the company had agreements with
14,000 retailers—a figure that reached 20,000 by the 1960s and included
several significant national retail chains.21
An Uneasy Relationship? Selling Provident to Retailers
Provident’s arrangements with retailers were not secured without controversy.
Shopkeepers opposed to the system claimed that Provident customers could
be easily “spotted,” that prices were raised to cover the discount the retailer
had to pay Provident, or that “a special line of rubbish” was held in store
for them.22 In 1910, one female shopper provided evidence of such a tactic,
informing a newspaper that when she produced a Provident check to pay for a
jacket, she was asked for an additional 9 percent on the marked retail price.23
The extent of these practices is unclear, but shopkeepers prioritized cash buy-
ers over Provident check users, and the company advised its customers to
“shop as little as possible” on Saturdays and to make purchases “around the
middle of the week,” when retailers would, they were instructed, “serve you
far better.”24
Despite Provident’s instructions to its customers, many retailers and their
representatives remained hostile to the check trade. In 1908, Drapers Record
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claimed the practice had caused “a decrease of legitimate profit-bearing
turnover” and argued that “the retail trade must annihilate the [check] clubs
or be itself destroyed.”25 Shopkeepers attempted to educate the public about
Provident’s hidden costs. In 1913, one group paraded a donkey through Bury
town center, carrying a legend that labeled any check customer “an ass.”26
Twenty-five years later, the Daily Express reported that retailers’ organizations
had issued the public “with leaflets exposing the check system.” The news-
paper alleged that retailers and customers were being milked to enable check
trading companies to make annual profits of up to 1,700 percent. It urged
that these firms “be rigorously curtailed” and made subject to the 48 per-
cent interest rate cap that had been applied to moneylending transactions in
1927.27 The Daily Express had got its sums rather badly wrong. In 1934, for
example, Provident’s profit of £285,000 on a turnover of £5.7m was slightly
less than 5 percent.28 The charges imposed on retailers were significant, how-
ever, and it is important to ask why so many retailers were willing to accept
Provident checks.
In 1915, Credit Draper debated this issue. It asked how, with fees up to
17.5 percent, Provident and other check traders had “managed to get rep-
utable shopkeepers to fall into their trap.”29 One retailer who had succumbed
to Provident’s overtures claimed turnover rose only until other retailers also
began to accept checks. Thereafter, he was left paying fees for what he dismis-
sively dubbed Provident’s “American business.”30 The allegedly Americanized
and un-British nature of installment selling was a common theme in the early
twentieth century, from the plebeian check trade through to much more
affluent markets, such as that for motor cars.31 But offering credit to the
working classes always elicited the most heavily moralized discourse. Thus,
another disillusioned shopkeeper, angered by waits of up to six months to
be reimbursed by Provident for the checks presented in his shop, dismissed
Waddilove’s claim that his system facilitated working-class thrift: “The whole
system is one of borrowing, not thrift, and any system that encourages the
working classes to borrow must be demoralising.”32
However, the enormous number of retailers who accepted Provident
checks is evidence that many anticipated advantages from involvement in
the scheme. Increased turnover was clearly one. Provident agents represented
mobile advertisements for retailers whose details appeared on the shopping
lists given customers. One retailer who had been converted to the system
argued, in 1908, that far more misery had “been brought to homes by the
packman [credit draper].” His view of the check trade was colored, no doubt,
by the fact that his annual turnover had risen from £2,000 to £5,000. Another
shop owner reasoned that check users “invariably spend more than their
check,” with additional cash purchases reducing the impact of the retailer’s
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payment to Provident. Manufacturers also functioned as an ally in Provident’s
advance. One large footwear producer, for example, offered to stock a shop
for a Manchester retailer, but only if he were to “open an account with the
Provident.”33
The issue of securing new types of customers for retailers lay at the heart of
Provident’s success. In effect, rather like modern-day subprime credit compa-
nies, the company developed a system that enabled it to operate in a market
deemed too risky by regular retailers or banks. Melanie Tebbutt has argued
that in early twentieth-century Britain a greater demand for consumer credit
forced many reluctant retailers to adopt installment selling.34 Provident lay at
the heart of that process, because the company enabled retailers to avoid the
costs and risks associated with financing credit independently. Retailers who
joined the scheme did not have to assess credit risk, pursue nonpayers, or face
the financial- or status-reducing costs of suing debtors in the courts. In short,
it was Provident, not the retailer, that handled the economically and morally
charged relationship with the customer, and it is that relationship to which
this chapter now turns.
An Exploitative Relationship? Provident and Its Customers
Customer demand for Provident’s service was evidenced by its startling
growth. Provident agents followed a well-trodden path, pursuing credit drap-
ers and insurance collectors into working-class districts; and, in turn, their
track was taken by football pools collectors and mail-order catalog agents.35
Thus, working-class households were accustomed to the weekly knock on the
door from a variety of commercial callers. In 1920, one area of 3,500 residents
in the port city of Hull was visited each week by as many as 100 insurance
collectors.36 Adopting a fieldwork organization that had served the industrial
insurance companies so well, Provident amassed a small army of mainly part-
time agents to seek out customers and, then, collect and monitor repayments.
Agents were instructed to closely observe the rhythms of working-class life.
Credit should be “kept low to the labourer with young children,” because
his disposable income would be limited, but it should be increased “in future
when [the children] work.” When the children left home, to set up their own
households, their parents’ “credit levels must be watched again and reduced,”
while the new home should be visited and the young adults “encouraged to
take up credit.”37
The agent also had a disciplinary function, similar to that noted by
Paul Johnson for the industrial insurance collectors, whose weekly visits
imposed the discipline of contract on working-class families by reminding
them of “long-run goals” when “there was scarcely enough money to feed the
family.”38 Waddilove used this argument himself, claiming that his system
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was a form of thrift. He maintained that although critical observers declared
that “the working man ought to save his shilling a week himself ” and acquire
merchandise only when he had the funds to do so, it was “very difficult to
keep the shilling untouched.” The agent’s visit, Waddilove argued, ensured
that the shilling was kept as “payment for clothes and boots.”39
Here we can see a leading promoter of credit reinventing ideas of
thriftiness that anticipated Lendol Calder’s argument in chapter 12 about
the complex relationship between thrift and credit in modern consumer
economies. The nature of that relationship differed between nations and
among social groups in each national setting. Thus, the Provident model for
credit rating differed markedly from that developed by SCHUFA in Germany
(see chapter 6), being based on face-to-face local networks rather than the
automated accumulation of data on consumer transactions. For example, one
credit retailer reported in 1929 that Provident did not take on a customer
without obtaining one reference from a shopkeeper and two local house-
holders.40 Thereafter, the company relied on the agent’s skill in maintaining
an effective and profitable relationship with the customer. Provident could
also draw upon the fact that its checks offered access to numerous retail-
ers to ensure that repayments to it had a higher priority than those to less
utilitarian rivals.
The complicated financial interchange among customer, retailer, and
Provident left check buyers with a vague notion of the system’s full costs.
For those managing tight budgets, the key issue was the size of the weekly
repayment. If that sum could be met, there was, then, the prospect of pay-
ing something akin to cash prices. As one Belfast check buyer explained:
“all you paid on these Provident checks was one shilling to the pound—
five percent—so they weren’t too bad, they weren’t really extortive. But
probably the shops who took the Provident checks were dearer to shop in
than the shops that didn’t.”41 From the perspective of many working-class
customers with limited credit options, Provident stood out, and research indi-
cates that it was their favored form of credit during the interwar period.
One Newcastle woman recalled that “when the Provident came onto the
scene it was ideal. That’s how I brought up my family, with the help of the
Provident.”42
There were a number of reasons for this popularity. An extremely signifi-
cant one is touched upon by Silke Meyer in chapter 10 for the German case.
She explains the insights that anthropology can bring to our understanding of
modern credit economies by viewing credit as a system of exchange and reci-
procity. This perspective also informs the history of working-class credit in
the United Kingdom. There historians have explained how the employment
of part-time agents deployed in their own communities enabled credit com-
panies to embed themselves within established working-class social networks.
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In doing so, they commercialized the trust that existed within those commu-
nities, while also utilizing the norm of respectability to ensure that bad debt
levels were low. It was harder for a working-class woman to fall behind in
payments to an agent whom she knew well than it was to ignore the letters of
a distant corporation. Moreover, these close relationships ensured that Pierre
Bourdeiu’s dictum that credit “creates obligations by creating people obliged
to reciprocate” was central to the creation of long-term loyalty among cus-
tomers of Provident and other credit companies, allowing them to capture
elements of gifting within a commercial relationship.43
Customers also appreciated the fact that Provident checks represented a
much more flexible form of credit than others on offer. This was reflected
in the different uses that they made of checks. The more affluent of the
company’s customers used what were called “relay checks” (a series of checks
granted one after another) to pay for higher-priced goods that normally were
bought by hire purchase. Taking this route to the ownership of durable goods
may have been viewed as offering security by many check users who were
aware of so-called hire-purchase snatch backs. A great deal of press atten-
tion was focused on “snatch backs,” the repossession of merchandise due
to late payment, and Avram Taylor has described the shame experienced by
working-class consumers who had prized consumer goods removed from their
homes in full view of neighbors during the 1930s.44 Provident checks facili-
tated ownership of the merchandise and gave buyers a level of protection not
available to hire purchasers.
Toward the other end of the working-class income spectrum, checks were
acquired during passages of domestic crisis management. In such circum-
stances, Provident checks were often acquired to facilitate the purchase of
items that were immediately pawned to raise cash.45 Thus, the customer
had only to raise the cash to pay for the first installment on the check, in
order to realize a larger sum on the pawned item to deal with whatever
pressing financial crisis was at hand. For similar reasons, a secondary mar-
ket sprang up in the buying and selling of Provident checks. A court case
in the port of West Hartlepool, in 1953, heard that several women were
engaged in “wholesale illicit trading” in this respect, buying checks valued
at £1 (20 shillings) for 15 shillings. They were then sold to more fortu-
nate consumers for 16 shillings.46 However, the majority of check users had
more mundane reasons for their decision to employ the system, using it to
meet family clothing requirements. Analysis of Provident’s records demon-
strate that demand for checks was greatest in the final quarter of each year, as
customers readied themselves for Christmas.47
A further aspect of a Provident check’s flexibility was its acceptance by
so many retailers. Customers, therefore, did not have to engage in multiple
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requests for credit with a succession of retailers. Not only did this save time,
but it also reduced the potential for publically shaming rejections. Moreover,
a check could be subdivided and spent in more than one store. In the view
of one Scottish woman, this gave a Provident check more utility than the
Cooperative movement’s equivalent, the mutuality club voucher: “it was a
big advantage . . . it was not a case of one shop. The Co-op gave you 20 weeks
or 38 weeks but then you only had the Co-op, whereas the Provident gave
you a selection of different shops . . . [Y]ou could spend it in Paisley and you
could spend it in Glasgow, it was not as if you were constricted.”48 This
viewpoint differed from one aired in a report by the Women’s Group on
Public Welfare in 1943. It was highly critical of “wrong spending” by con-
sumers using checks, whereas it praised the mutuality clubs.49 The Co-op’s
system levied similar fees for their doorstep collections as Provident, but pur-
chases made contributed to the quarterly dividends earned by co-operative
members. However, the Women’s Group on Public Welfare was ignorant of
the fact that only co-operative customers with healthy financial balances in
their dividend accounts were granted credit, a factor that excluded large num-
bers of consumers.50 Subsequent histories of working-class credit, which have
acknowledged the cultural and economic context in which working-class fam-
ilies budgeted, have produced much richer understandings of their actions
than that offered by either the Women’s Group on Public Welfare or the civil
servant who, in 1952, labeled check users as “the feckless and often stupid
poor.” Material factors such as family size, economic misfortune, or limited
alternative credit channels had little place in his assessment.51
The size of Provident’s customer base alone should have stifled such pejo-
rative sentiments. By 1908, Provident’s 85 branches employed 3,000 agents.52
Two years later, it claimed to be the originator of “the best and most popu-
lar credit system ever devised,” declaring itself a “real boon to the respectable
working-class.”53 Annual collections, £1 million in 1910, rose to £5 million
in 1925, at which point there were 616,000 customers. By the mid-1930s,
and again in the 1950s, the company serviced over 1 million customers and
their families.54
Provident in European Perspective
Our opinionated civil servant might have been given further food for thought
had he taken a glance over the English Channel to France and Germany.
In both countries, systems evolved that bore comparison with Provident
checks. In France, Crépin coupons were the best known of these. Named
after Jacques-François Crépin, they became a national institution under the
direction of his successor, George Dufayel. They originated in the 1850s,
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when Crepin began selling photographic portraits on installment. Demand
for this service led to the employment of travelers, who were also soon pro-
moting the sale of furniture and clothing. Customers were granted a coupon,
worth 100 francs, after an original 25 percent down payment, and they paid
the remaining sum in weekly payments. Retailers met most of the system’s
costs, paying as much as 50 percent commission for the customers brought to
their doors.55 These high costs discredited the coupons and, in 1869, Dufayel
reorganized the scheme. By 1904, it was claimed that the system had served
3.5 million customers. In Paris alone, there were 800 abonneurs (collectors),
each responsible for two streets. They made inquiries with employers about
potential customers’ solvency, recorded other information on their reliability,
collected repayments, and encouraged good payers to make further purchases.
Four hundred shops accepted the coupons, paying 18 percent commission.
As was the case with Provident checks, questions were raised about the
quality of merchandise sold to coupon customers and whether or not prices
were inflated. Dufayel responded to critics by arguing that the system allowed
workers to acquire the comforts of life without being exploited by usurers.
The company also pointed out that it was sympathetic toward slow-paying
customers, if they had been beset by matters such as disease, pregnancy, or
prolonged unemployment.56 This was an approach shared with Provident,
which was compelled to present an empathetic persona when hearing of
a customer’s economic woes. In 1929, one Provident executive wrote that
such cases “are normal trade risks, and the only course open is to encourage
payment of a small amount from such sources as unemployment pay, until
employment is once more obtained.”57 This approach was a further factor
designed to elicit a sense of obligation and loyalty among customers.
Thus, like Provident, Dufayel’s credit network “relied on local con-
tacts, word of mouth, and face-to-face encounters.”58 On these foundations,
Dufayel claimed—as Waddilove did—to have established the world’s biggest
consumer credit concern.59 Dufayel’s achievements forced other French retail-
ers to form “an ambitious credit plan of their own.” In 1904, more than
fifty stores created the Economic Union of Saint-Denis, which offered an
alternative to Crépin coupons. Several other such syndicates followed in its
wake.60
Germany also developed a similar method of consumer credit, which has
been described as “indigenous” and owing little to American credit models.
This was the Königsberg system, named after the city in which it originated
in 1926. Established by an installment bank (the Kundkredit GmbH), it
was most widely taken up by members of the industrial working class. Like
the Provident system, customers avoided the daunting task of negotiating
credit with numerous retailers. Instead, credit limits were arranged with the
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bank financing the scheme. Annual interest rates levied ranged from 35 to
53 percent, a level that one contemporary noted could be judged “uncon-
scionable” in the German courts. Unlike Dufayel’s business, the Königsberg
scheme reemerged after 1948, but its history and demise have yet to be related
fully.61 As Rebecca Belverderis-Kochs outlines in chapter 2, the Sparkassen
(quasi-public savings banks) entered the installment lending market in 1952,
and this development certainly provides one explanation for the death of the
Königsberg system. In France, the view is that rising working-class living stan-
dards during les trente glorieuses increased spending power and created markets
for more modern forms of consumer credit while also killing off demand for
older forms. This process was assisted by the extension of banking services to
89 percent of the French population by 1980 and 100 percent by the 1990s.62
The Survival of Provident
In the United Kingdom, by contrast, Provident found a new lease on life in
the final decades of the twentieth century. Initially, this appeared an unlikely
outcome. Provident’s market began to stagnate during the 1950s, and levels
of new business fell persistently year on year by some 4 percent during the
1950s.63 Many of its traditional customers were attracted to the increasing
range of merchandise available in mail-order catalogs. By the early 1960s,
mail-order companies produced colorful catalogs of up to 1,000 pages in
length, which The Times described as “a riot of consumer goods” and “an
index to the affluent society.”64
Like Provident, the mail-order sector developed an agency system that
tapped into working-class sociability and reciprocity. As many as 900,000
part-time agents were calling upon friends, neighbors, and workmates to
show them their catalog by the 1960s.65 Significantly, almost nine in ten
agents were female and were stimulated predominantly by the opportunity
the catalog provided to reinforce social relationships, or to establish fresh
ones, rather than the modest sales commission that could be earned. This
created a particularly effective sales force, whose connections with their cus-
tomers ensured low levels of bad debt.66 In this increasingly competitive
environment, Provident was fortunate that many of its customers demon-
strated significant levels of cultural inertia. Many continued to use the
company when they might have been expected to utilize their rising earnings
by accessing more modern forms of credit. Thus, there was a lag between
economic and cultural change.67
The company responded to the changing economic climate by attempt-
ing to follow the path being taken by the new “affluent workers,” who were
the subject of so much postwar political and sociological discussion. In 1962,
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Provident left the ownership of the Waddilove family and became a public
company. A new management team, with experience in other fields of con-
sumer credit, instigated a process of modernization. Richard Davenport, who
had worked in hire purchase and rose to become Provident’s chairman, was
struck by the access it had to customer’s homes via its 10,000 mostly female
agents. He asked, “Who on earth else had that sort of lever?” and launched
initiatives to exploit this relationship further and to remove the idea that
Provident was a means through which “to buy coal and shoes.”68
As part of its modernization, the company introduced vouchers of higher
values than its traditional checks. Initially they were for sums of up to £100,
but climbed to £200 by 1970. Collection charges for vouchers were as much
as 15 percent of their value and were repaid over 40 to 100 weeks. The annual
percentage rate (APR) levels of interest for these products were between 44
and 55 percent. This was lower than the rates for checks, for which customers,
by the 1970s, also paid 15 percent of their value, but the shorter repayment
periods meant they had APRs of up to 97 percent. The rise in collection
charges for checks was the result of retailers negotiating down the commis-
sion they paid, as credit card and store card use took off and became more
attractive to them.69
The introduction of vouchers was significant because they enabled con-
sumers and retailers to circumvent the government’s controls on hire-
purchase and installment sales. In operation for most of the period between
1952 and 1982, so-called terms control stipulated minimum deposit pay-
ments and maximum repayment periods on installment sales.70 The sale of
vouchers, which could be used to pay for either deposits or for the full cost of
consumer durables, was not covered by terms control. As a result, Provident
was lifted out of an uncertain passage of trading by government policies that
helped to associate the company with luxury rather than necessitous con-
sumption.71 The government described the use of vouchers as “a serious gap
in credit controls at those times when it is needed,” which had attracted
“refugees from hire-purchase.” By 1966, £25 million worth of business was
being done by clothing and footwear retailers and department stores, offering
their own checks and vouchers, including companies such as Great Univer-
sal Stores and Philips Electrical.72 For Provident, vouchers opened the door to
agreements with a number of major retailers such as British Home Stores, Fos-
ter Menswear, Halfords, Woolworth, Rumblelows Ltd., H. Samuel Ltd., John
Collier, Burtons, Hepworths Ltd., Boots, W. H. Smith, and Debenhams.73
In the wake of this success, Provident made further plans to extend its
financial services. Noting, in 1971, that half the UK population did not
have a bank account, Provident purchased the People’s Bank. The inten-
tion was to transform this moribund institution into a competitor to the
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government-backed Trustee Savings Bank. Its vision was to “move away from
the Clothing and Supply image more and more into the People’s Bank.”74
This initiative was deemed necessary, as the company was again losing
younger and more affluent customers (typically those who were buying their
own homes rather than renting) to credit and store card providers.75 As a
result, check and voucher sales declined by a third, in real terms, between
1971 and 1979.76
A survey of Provident’s customers in this period is indicative of the solidly
working-class nature of its business, with 92 percent of its turnover conducted
with this group. Provident was particularly reliant on custom from families
in the semi-skilled manual worker, unskilled worker, unemployed, and pen-
sioner categories.77 Heaviest users of the company were parents with young
children, as indicated by the fact that children’s clothing topped the list of
items purchased by checks. A much greater proportion of check users lived
in rented accommodation than the general population, with 71 percent of
Provident customers residing in public housing estates.78 Around half its cus-
tomers held a bank account by the end of the 1970s, but hire purchase, bank
loans, and retailers’ credit were used by only 5, 7, and 7 percent, respectively.79
In the final two decades of the century, it was from these groups—not the
affluent working class—that Provident continued to obtain its core market.
Moreover, this market was maintained through the transfer of its traditional
techniques into the field of doorstep moneylending.
The Commercialization of Doorstep Moneylending
TheMoneylenders Act of 1927 set a nominal interest rate that could be set for
loans. This led to the stagnation of the legal moneylending sector; registered
lenders fell from 9,173 in 1925, to 3,759 in 1930, and to 1,588 by 1949.80
It did not, however, curtail the illegal moneylending market, which operated
in working-class areas, often with female lenders providing small advances
to their neighbors.81 The authorities were not keen to investigate this market
and, by the late 1950s, commercial moneylenders such as Neville Greenwood
became aware that there was little official appetite to enforce the rate cap,
so they began to experiment with doorstep lending.82 They were joined by
significant numbers of check traders or credit drapers who used their existing
agents to market direct loans to customers.
Their experiments unearthed a significant demand. This was partly the
result of the decline of pawnbroking; the number of pawnbrokers had dipped
from 2,981 in 1935–36 to 402 in 1968.83 Major redevelopment of inner-city
neighborhoods, which often involved the demolition of the local pawnbro-
ker’s premises and the construction of new estates on city outskirts, was a
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major reason for this.84 While a visit to the pawnbroker was increasingly
impractical for any of the 3.5 million Britons living on council estates in the
1960s, moneylenders were willing to call to the homes of those who required
a loan. Ironically, therefore, moneylender registrations climbed to 2,500 by
the end of the swinging sixties.85
Noting this development, Provident began offering cash loans in 1972.
Many of the company’s customers quickly came to “to prefer the cash
scheme” rather than checks or vouchers.86 Credit Trader explained that cus-
tomers of the new moneylenders wanted “to shop at Marks & Spencer
or C & A Modes, neither of whom accept checks, or buy a set of tyres
with 30 percent off . . . all of which may be beyond their immediate needs.”
These customers wanted “cash, or, in the modern idiom, a personal loan.”87
By 1979, the value of personal loans issued by Provident was greater than
that of its checks and vouchers, and moneylending was becoming its core
activity.88
The rejuvenation of doorstep moneylending was given a further fillip by
an increasingly liberalized approach to interest rates in the 1960s and 1970s.
Financial journalists described how the courts began to view lending “money
as comparable to the sale of a commodity” and upheld contracts with interest
rates “as high as 120% on short-term advances.”89 Following the Crowther
Committee’s investigation of the United Kingdom’s consumer credit market,
the Consumer Credit Act of 1974 removed the 48 percent cap on consumer
lending. Crowther’s view was that the “first principle of social policy should be
to treat the users of consumer credit as adults, who are fully capable of man-
aging their own financial affairs, and not to restrict their freedom of access to
it in order to protect the relatively small minority who get into difficulties.”90
The committee placed its faith on educating the public about interest rates
and placing legal responsibilities on all lenders to display APRs prominently
on all documentation. A safety net remained, with courts empowered to rene-
gotiate agreements deemed extortionate. However, this measure proved of
limited use. Only customers could make a legal complaint, not consumer
bodies or other groups with greater knowledge of the legal intricacies. Very
few cases reached the courts.91 Crowther’s support for consumer education, as
opposed to a more paternalistic approach, reflected wider government policy
during a period that witnessed a shift away from regulation in the belief that
this would increase competition and consumer choice.92 In 1981, an analysis
of the cost of lending discovered that APRs for bank loans ranged from 20 to
23 percent, credit card rates were as high as 31 percent, hire-purchase rates
were as much as 57 percent, whereas levels for Provident and other doorstep
moneylenders were between 65 and 756 percent. The moneylenders claimed
that this method of calculating costs did not compare like with like and that
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annual interest rates had a “distorting effect” when applied to short-term
loans that were expensive to administer and collect.93
Despite the interest rates associated with their loans, Provident and other
doorstep lenders had an estimated market of almost 3 million customers by
the early 1990s.94 A number of factors explain this development. The propor-
tion of Britons living in poverty, or at its margins, rose from 22 to 28 percent
between the late 1970s and early 1990s. An increase in unemployment levels
was the most significant factor in this rise, but growing numbers in low-paid
jobs and the reductions in some benefit levels also promoted this develop-
ment.95 A further factor was the rise in single-parent families (usually headed
by women), whose numbers increased by 50 percent to 1.2 million during
the 1980s.96 These groups were to become a major component of the United
Kingdom’s subprime sector. It also included those excluded from mainstream
credit due to their poor credit record or their history of bad debt, often
as a result of the housing market crash of the early 1990s that resulted in
mainstream financial providers engaging in “a flight to quality.”97
The market for the UK’s subprime sector included pawnbrokers, sale
and buy-back outlets (like the Cash Converters chain), and rental purchase
shops (such as Brighthouse, formerly Crazy George’s), as well as the doorstep
lenders.98 The market for each of these products rose as the personal finance
industry increasingly segmented the market through computerized risk assess-
ment and credit scoring—a process that frequently sifted out council or
housing association tenants.99 As a result, large numbers of Britons remained
without access to mainstream financial services. A study published in 2008
suggested the UK figure was 6 percent, compared with 3 percent for Germany
and 2 percent for France.100 Some even found it more difficult to access
mail-order catalog credit, which was identified as the one form of credit
that straddled mainstream and fringe credit markets. Between the 1970s and
1990s, traditional catalog agents dwindled in number, and average customers
per agent had dropped to two or three, as the majority used their catalog
for their own household only and were less willing to entrust their neighbors
with credit.101 This trend has been explained with recourse to the sociologist
Philip Abrams’ concept of “modern neighbourhoodism.” The suggestion is
that late twentieth-century communities did not “constrain their inhabitants
into strongly bonded relationships with one another” and that the “diffuse
trust and reciprocity of traditional neighbourhoods . . . collapsed in the face
of new social patterns.”102
It was in this climate that Provident abandoned its early 1970s plan to
move upmarket and became as heavily associated with low-income consumers
as it had ever been. This association proved highly profitable. In 1998, private
investors were being advised to purchase shares in the company in order to
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“[b]uy on rising social inequality.” With a market valuation of £1 billion,
Provident’s burgeoning share price left it knocking on the door of the United
Kingdom’s elite top 100 companies.103
Thus, a sector of the credit industry whose closest European counter-
parts had withered and died survived and thrived in the fertile soil offered
by British legal and socioeconomic conditions. Unlike the French Dufayel
system, Provident was not decimated by a German invasion in 1940. There-
after, it was able to take advantage of cultural inertia among its traditional
customers by devising new services that allowed it to tentatively engage with
the affluent society. Then, once again, the company’s fortunes reflected the
ebbing nature of inequality in British society. When discussion of the afflu-
ent worker gave way to concerns about a developing underclass, Provident
switched tack to utilize its traditional methods. Through the twists and turns
of its history, it has also ridden on the back of UK government policies on
consumer credit, first benefitting indirectly from controls on hire purchase
before taking more direct advantage of a liberal approach to interest rates
ceilings. In the final calculation, it was the absence of a ceiling that enabled
lenders like Provident to continue their expensive form of face-to-face credit.
This, rather than any cultural peculiarity of the British working classes, seems
to offer the strongest explanation of why this area of the British consumer
credit industry has persisted. Provident’s loss of its more affluent customers
to credit cards and store cards during the 1970s would also appear to support
that view, as ultimately consumers chose the impulses of economic interests
over culturally inherited forms of credit. The fact that Provident has, in the
past decade, exported its lending model to new markets, including Poland,
the Czech Republic, Mexico, and Hungary, also supports the view that British
low-income consumers are not unique.104
British consumers have had to go without some of the more equitable
financial options available to their European and North American counter-
parts. Credit unions, in particular, have had limited success in the United
Kingdom. The scholars of Germany writing with this volume would no
doubt agree that the Sparkassen promoted more equitable forms of lending
than are associated with the United Kingdom’s doorstep lenders. Indeed, if we
compare the United Kingdom’s record of financial inclusion with the rest of
Europe, it is clear that the banks have failed to meet the financial requirements
of the least affluent consumers.
In recent years, the UK government has resisted calls to impose a ceil-
ing cap on doorstep lenders. The government accepted the view that any
such cap would increase the scale of illegal moneylending, with all the
potential for dubious lending and violence that might entail. This view was
supported by controversial research carried out for the government, which
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claimed caps in France and Germany had produced illegal lending mar-
kets that were, respectively, three and two and a half times the illegal sector
in the United Kingdom.105 These findings have been hotly contested and
labeled as “abominable research” by the European Coalition for Responsi-
ble Credit.106 The UK government’s perspective can certainly be critiqued
as economically deterministic. It ignores, for example, the culturally specific
aspects of consumer credit history and assumes that evasion of an interest
ceiling is inevitable and that demand for credit is inelastic. It is oblivious to
the claim that historians would make that each nation has its own particular
history of credit that is infused with cultural, economic, and political contin-
gencies. Jan Logemann has recently made a strong case for Germany in this
respect.107 This chapter has attempted to carry out a similar task in the case
of the United Kingdom, where it is clear that the cultural and social history
of UK credit merged with particular government policies to produce a very
particular subprime credit market. The history of Provident lies very much at
its center.
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